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Abstract
We argue in this paper that attention to one’s blog is won by
paying attention to other bloggers. We derive properties of blog-
ging networks from a model where bloggers trade attention and
content. The predictions from the model are then checked against
a novel dataset from LiveJournal, a major blogging community.
As predicted, the activity of bloggers is found to be related to the
size and level of reciprocity within a blogger’s relational network.
We also find that bloggers who do not adhere to reciprocity norms
are sanctioned with a lower number of readers.
JEL Classifications: D63, D85, H41, L17, L82, L86, Z13.
Keywords: Blog; Community; Internet; LiveJournal; Media;
Reciprocity; Social Network; Web 2.0.
This paper offers a model of blogging activity in which members of blog-
ging communities derive utility from other people reading their blogs
as well as from reading the blogs of other people. We argue that in this
context, a norm of reciprocity occurs naturally as a result of a competi-
tive equilibrium in an economy where the currency is mutual attention.
∗This paper was presented at the Second FLOSS Workshop in Rennes in June
2008, at the Fifth bi-annual Conference on The Economics of the Software and In-
ternet Industries in Toulouse in January 2009 and at the 2009 Annual Conference
of the Royal Economic Society in Guilford in April 2009. We are grateful to Adelina
Gschwandtner, Peter Moffatt and Paul Seabright for useful discussion. The support
of the ESRC is gratefully acknowledged.
†Unaffiliated, email: a.gaudeul@gmail.com, website: http://agaudeul.free.fr.
‡Unaffiliated, email: laurencefmathieu@yahoo.co.uk.
§School of Economics, University of East Anglia and Rimini Center for Economic
Analysis (RCEA), email: c.peroni@uea.ac.uk.
1
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Such a norm of reciprocity is defined as follows: “in a network, an agent
that offers little content compared to others must compensate this by
devoting more attention to others in order to maintain her place in the
network. Conversely, an agent that offers a lot of content compared to
others can devote less attention to others and still maintain her place
in the network”. Attention is a cognitive process that is difficult to mea-
sure. It is linked to time spent selectively concentrating on one aspect
of the environment while ignoring other aspects; it is also linked to the
cognitive involvement in that activity. However, we are able to use a
number of measures of attention from data gathered on the activity of
2767 bloggers drawn randomly from LiveJournal to check the model’s
predictions. We argue that the empirical patterns of mutual attention
in that sample are broadly consistent with our model.
1 Context
In recent years, blogs established themselves as an important way to
produce, promote and read content on the Internet, and also as a tool
for social networking. Although statistics on blogs and bloggers are
notoriously fickle (Bialik, 2005), the following figures suggest the im-
portance of the blogging phenomenon. Henning (2005) estimated the
number of blogs at 53 million by the end of 2005 (see figure 2 in ap-
pendix B), with a previous report (Perseus Development Corporation,
2003) estimating that about one third of them were active. Technorati,
which ranks blogs by popularity, claimed to track about 113 million
blogs in May 2008. A seller of search targeted advertising, Chitika, es-
timated from its own data that the top 50 thousand blogs in terms of
Technorati ranking generated a total of $500 million in ad revenues in
2006, with the top 5000 getting 80% of those revenues.1 An emarketer
survey estimated advertising on social networking sites at $1.2 billion
in 2008.2
A number of companies are involved in the development of blogging
software and the management of blogging platforms. Among those are
Google’s Blogger, Six Apart’s Typepad, SUP’s LiveJournal, Wordpress,
Facebook and News Corp’s MySpace.
Beyond those companies directly involved in blogging, the influence
of blogs is wide ranging. A May 2008 survey by Brodeur, a unit of Om-
nicom Group, found that journalists made use of blogs for their news
report, felt that blogs influenced the focus and brought diversity to
news, but also felt that they lowered the quality and accuracy of news
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reports, as well as the tone of the coverage.3 For example, the BBC
controversially relied on (micro)bloggers in its coverage of the Mum-
bai terrorist attacks.4 As a sign of growing credibility, Austria Presse
Agentur (APA) recently included blogs into its Medienbeobachtung 3.0
facility to monitor news in real time.5 The influence of blogs extends
beyond news. For example, travel blogs are an increasingly important
mechanism for exchanging information among tourists and are thus
important for countries with a large tourism sector (Wenger, 2008).
1.1 LiveJournal
The empirical part of this paper relies on a novel dataset from Live-
Journal (“LJ”), a web-based community where Internet users can main-
tain their blog. LiveJournal, at http://www.livejournal.com, of-
fers its users a fast and easy way to create and maintain their own blog
and to interact with and follow updates from other bloggers. LiveJour-
nal is essentially an aggregation tool with lock-in effect, where blog-
gers write and read public and private entries, participate in commu-
nities and exchange comments, and thus develop relations with other
LJ users that are not replicable on another blogging tool.
Created in 1999 by Brad Fitzpatrick, LJ is based on open-source
code and was initially maintained by a community of volunteers. LJ
was purchased in January 2005 by Six Apart, the owners of Typepad –
another popular blog host. The profit making aspect of LJ then became
more important: “sponsored” (advertising-bearing) accounts were in-
troduced and the discrepancy between services offered to free versus
paying users widened. In December 2007, Six Apart sold LiveJournal
to SUP, a Russian company that was already managing LJ in Russia,
and which removed in March 2008 the option to create free accounts.
Widespread protests by users led to the option being re-instated in Au-
gust 2008.6
In February 2009, the number of blogs on LJ totalled more than 18
millions, of which 1.2 million (7%) had been updated in the previous 30
days. Of the top 15 countries, 63% of users were located in the United
States, 13% in the Russian Federation, 6% in Canada and 5% in the
UK.7 Of the 72% of users who chose to reveal their gender to LJ on
registration8, two-thirds were female. The average age of bloggers on
LJ was 25, the median was 22 and the mode was 20.9
This study focuses on LiveJournal because it provides more detailed
and easily accessible information on users’ activity than other blog
hosts. Information on LJ users is accessible on the “user information”
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page, the content of which is described in appendix A. Some data is pro-
vided by default and cannot be hidden by the user: user name, account
number, date of creation, status of the account (i.e. early adopter, per-
manent, paid, free, sponsored), name and number of friends and read-
ers, number of posts made, number of comments made and received,
etc. . . Other data, such as the blogger’s date of birth, location, list of
interests, and any additional information, is provided on a voluntary
basis.10
Much of the analysis in this paper focuses on the lists of friends and
on the act of friending. Those words have a range of different meanings
on LJ (Fono and Raynes-Goldie, 2006). At a technical level, a friend is a
blog the user subscribes to, that is, whose updates appear on the user’s
“friends’ page”, a page where the entries made by the blogger’s friends
appear in reverse chronological order. Listing someone as a friend is
what is referred to as friending. While some LJ friendships reflect
“real world” friendships, many are exclusive to LJ and are formed and
maintained by reading and posting comments on each other’s blogs.
Friending is a meaningful and potentially costly act, as friends are able
to read “friends-only” entries, i.e. those entries that are not accessible
unless one is logged in LJ and one is listed as a friend.11 “Friendship”
therefore acquires a meaning that is not present to the same extent
in other blog networks or with RSS readers; it means confidence and
readiness for closer intimacy. It is also a public act since other users
can observe who is friend with whom via the friend list on the blogger’s
user info (public profile). This is an act that commits the blogger to at
least browse through their friends’ entries every time they read their
own friends’ page. Finally, friendships must be maintained over time
since reciprocation of friendship is always at risk of being withdrawn
(‘unfriending’). This is why the term “friend” on LJ does carry its usual
meaning of liking and being involved with someone.
All the above explains why many LJ users attach great significance
to the act of ‘friending’ and of dropping other users from one’s friend
list. Status within LJ is often linked to the number of users who list you
as friend, which leads some users to engage in ‘popularity contests’.12
Underlining again the importance of the act of friending, many users
do not welcome unsolicited friendships, that is, users who list another
as friend when that user does not wish to reciprocate.13
In the same vein, friendships are generally established with the
expectation of reciprocity. This means that a user usually expects a
friend to read her back in return; it also means that an user may be
reluctant to friend someone who is unlikely to reciprocate the friend-
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ship, and may drop from her friend list those who do not reciprocate
her friendship after a while. The extent to which those norms and type
of behaviour hold varies however from user to user and from situation
to situation.14 All this explains why the list of ‘friends’ and ‘friend of ’
(that is, the list of bloggers who list one as ‘friend’, from now on, ‘read-
ers’) is a variable of great interest in our study.
2 Related Literature
As noted by Drezner and Farrell (2008), blogs are ‘a major topic for re-
search’ and offer ‘extraordinarily fertile terrain for the social sciences’.
A number of views have been expressed about the role, value and fu-
ture of blogs and bloggers, in the media, in politics, or as a tool for
collaboration and information sharing. Ribstein (2005, 2006) and Las-
sica (2001) consider blogs as a newly emergent media form, while Le-
mann (2006) questions their value to journalism. Drezner and Farrell
(2008) evaluate blogs as a tool of political influence, while Sunstein
(2008) worries that blogs may contribute to a fracture in the political
discourse. Schmidt (2007) considers blogging networks as communi-
ties of shared practices, with their own rules in selecting blogs to read,
interacting with other bloggers and choosing what to publish. Huck
et al. (2008) are interested in how blogs help consumer choice and af-
fect firms’ reputations. Quiggin (2006) shows that blogs are part of the
‘creative commons’, along with Wikis and open source software.
More closely related to this paper are qualitative studies of blog-
gers’ motivations and of the relation between their activity and the
structure of their network of relations. Raynes-Goldie (2004) and Fono
and Raynes-Goldie (2006) find that bloggers are interested in produc-
ing their own content and opinions on current events, interacting with
other bloggers and generating debate on their own opinions, as well as
in joining communities of shared interests. Bar-Ilan (2005) shows that
bloggers act as information hubs with links to a number of topical web
sources. Furukawa et al. (2006) reveal that blog entries are primarily
read through links from other blogs. Backstrom et al. (2006) observe
that links between bloggers can be partly explained through common
membership in communities on LiveJournal. Lento et al. (2006) ex-
plain that continued activity within blogging networks is positively re-
lated to the number of relations established with other bloggers. Mishne
and Glance (2006) evidence a relationship between the popularity of a
weblog and the number of comments it attracts. Bachnik et al. (2005)
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establish that blog networks are only weakly connected, that they have
small worlds properties and that large networks are more likely to be
cliques (i.e. with few relations with other networks). Paolillo et al.
(2005) determine that LiveJournal users’ interests and their network
of friends are largely uncorrelated. On the other hand, Kumar et al.
(2004) note that a combination of age, location and interests explains a
large part of cross-linking patterns between users of LJ.
This paper contributes to the above literature with a network struc-
tural perspective inspired by insights from sociology (Granovetter, 1973)
and motivated by the growing importance of this field to economics
(Gui and Sugden, 2005). We present a model of network structure and
formation of links among individuals along the lines of Watts (2001),
Jackson (2003) and Newman (2003). We differ, however, from most
those papers in that we are particularly interested in developing in-
sights on the structure of directed networks, as in Caffarelli (2004) for
example. The issue of whether links are reciprocated or not, and the
related issue of the strength of relationships in a network, is an area of
study that has only recently been explored (Brueckner, 2006).
The main contribution of this paper is to exploit measures of the
characteristics of bloggers’ network along with measures of the type
and extent of their activities. We consider not only the structure of
links that an agent maintains, but also their direction, their intensity
and the intensity of the activity of the agent. We study the activity
– content production and attention devoted to others – of each node
– agent – in a context where money plays no role and there is no ex-
change currency, i.e. an agent cannot ‘pay’ attention she received with
attention she devoted to another agent. Our study allows us to develop
insights into the relation between motivations and interactions of blog-
gers: we show that bloggers do not care primarily about expressing
themselves, as then their posting activity would not depend on their
audience. Instead, we show that they care about interactions, as the
size of their network depends on measures of how many interactions
they have (comments received and made). We also develop insights into
blogging norms: a widespread expectation of reciprocity in individual
relations between bloggers is reflected at the individual blogger’s level
through a relation between the attention she devotes to other bloggers
and the attention she receives.
We show that, to some extent, an agent can exchange attention re-
ceived with content she produces, and there is thus a trade-off between
attention and content production; bloggers are ready to sacrifice atten-
tion received from a blogger if that blogger provides sufficient content,
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up to some limit. Indeed, we show that large deviations from a pattern
of reciprocal friendship are sanctioned. This paper shows that reci-
procity matters in an empirical online setting, and thus contributes
along the lines of Dohmen et al. (2009) or Gu et al. (2009) to the liter-
ature on how reciprocal behaviour influences the structure of human
activity.
Section 3 presents the model on which we ground our working hy-
potheses. Those are then tested empirically in section 5 using data
described in section 4.
3 A model of reciprocal (in)attention
In the following, we consider a model in which agents derive utility
from being paid attention to, and from reading the content of others.
In a competitive equilibrium, each individual relations that an agent
maintains must give her the same utility. This means that an agent
that provides more content than others has to be ‘paid’ more attention
– in both a figurative and quite literal sense, attention being the ex-
change currency among bloggers. More content is thus reciprocated
with more attention, and vice-versa. The model thus exposes a more
general form of reciprocity than if agents were to link only with agents
that have the same number of friends as they have, or only link with
agents that display their same level of overall blogging activity, or ex-
change one comment for a comment. We show the model is well de-
signed for the case of blogging. Indeed, a typical blogger’s reading list
includes a variety of more and of less popular blogs,15 and of blogs that
vary in their level of activity. This variety would not occur under less
general forms of reciprocity than the one we expose here.
We define a value function for each agent belonging to the net-
work as a function of the number of other bloggers she is linked to,
of whether those links are reciprocated, and of the bloggers’ activity.
Consider thus representative agent i who is part of a network of N
agents who produce their own content and read content generated by
others. e = (e1, e2, ..., eN) denotes the vector of content produced by
agents in the set N = {1, 2, ..., N} and n = (nij)i 6=j denotes the vector
of attentions (For example, agent i devotes attention nij to the content
produced by j 6= i). I (respectively J, K) denotes the number of friends
of representative agent i (respectively j, k). We assume free entry and
perfect information in the network, which implies that new agents may
enter at no cost and all agents know N , e and n.
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A simple additive form16 for the total utility of a representative
agent i is
Ui(n, e) = λi
∑
j 6=i
njiei︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility from being read
+
∑
j 6=i
nijej︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility from reading others
− C(ei)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of production
(1)
with λi ≥ 0, C(.) increasing, convex, and subject to
∑
j 6=i
nij ≤ Ti. λi mea-
sures the propensity to enjoy being read compared to the propensity to
enjoy reading others (normalised to 1 here). Ti is the attention budget
of agent i, i.e. the total attention that she can devote to her friends.
C(.) is the cost of content production.
Consider entrant i who has the choice between establishing a link
with agent j or an agent k. Agent i prefers establishing the link with
j if the gain in utility from doing so, λinjiei + nijej (the first part is
what is gained from being read by j, the second is what is gained by
reading j), is more than the gain in utility from establishing a link
with k, λinkiei + nikek.17With free entry and perfect information about
attention and effort exerted by all agents in the network, the surplus
gained from creating a link should be the same across all agents. If that
was not the case, then any agent who offers better surplus would keep
on gaining friends at the expense of others until a new equilibrium
was reached where equality was restored. Therefore, it must be that
the surplus obtained from j and from k is equal, so that
λinjiei + nijej = λinkiei + nikek (2)
which can be rewritten as
λi(nki − nji)ei = nijej − nikek (3)
Note that while this relation holds at the margin (‘marginal’ friend),
it also determines the relation between number of friends, readers and
activity in the aggregate.
In order to simplify this expression, we make two assumptions:
Assumption 1. If agent i lists both j and k as friend, then nij = nik.
This equality holds if for example i cannot vary attention individu-
ally and must thus devotes equal attention to all his friends. On Live-
Journal, agents can put some of their friends on special filters so as
3 A MODEL OF RECIPROCAL (IN)ATTENTION 9
to read those friends’ entries separately from others, and also to post
entries available only to those friends. However, the use of such tools
requires a certain degree of sophistication and is usually not publicised
by the blogger for fear of alienating others. It is therefore reasonable to
assume that attention is shared equally among friends on LiveJournal.
Assumption 2. All agents devote the same amount of attention to oth-
ers, that is, Ti = T for any i in the set N .
Combined with the above assumption, this means that since agent
i has I friends, then she devotes attention T/I to each of them. While
in practise, time available for blogging may vary among bloggers, this
does not necessarily mean a blogger with less time devotes noticeably
less attention to others. We tried empirically to proxy time available
for blogging with age or location, but those variable turned out not to
be significant.
The interpretation of the formula of equation (3) can then be divided
in two sections, (A) and (B), one considering the situation where both
j and k reciprocate i’s friendship, the other the situation where one of
the friendships is not reciprocated.
(A) Suppose both j and k reciprocate i’s friendship and suppose that
ej > ek (agent j offers more or better content or interactions). Then,
from formula (3), and assumption 1, I must have nki > nji. This means
that agent k, who produces less content than agent j, must devote more
attention to i than agent j needs to in order to be kept in the network
of i. Conversely, agent k, who devotes more attention to i than agent
j does, need not produce as much content than agent j in order to be
kept in the network of i.
In other terms, using assumption 2 as well as 1, agent k who pro-
duces less content than agent j has a lower number of friends than i
(i.e. she has K = T/nki friends, while j has J = T/nji friends).
(B) Suppose now j reciprocates the friendship but k does not, so
nki < nji. Under assumption 1, and from formula (3), this means that
we must have ek > ej : an agent that does not reciprocate a friendship
must be producing more content than another agent that reciprocates.
This leads us to defining the norm of reciprocity as follows: an
agent that offers little content compared to others in her network (ek <
ej) must compensate this by devoting more attention to those others
(nki > nji) in order to maintain her place in her network. Conversely,
an agent that offers a lot of content compared to others in a network is
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able to devote less attention to those others and still maintain her place
in the network.
Such a norm of reciprocity occurs naturally as a result of the com-
petitive equilibrium in a market where reciprocal attention is being
exchanged. Agents do not build or sustain links that are not reciprocal
in the sense expressed above. Note however that this norm of reci-
procity may also emerge not through a competitive process, but from
an innate sense of ‘justice’, or because agents consider it is a ‘desirable’
norm of behaviour that is to be encouraged in the setting in which the
agents operate.
Individual vs. aggregate data: Our data does not allow us to
determine whether an agent reciprocate a friendship at the individual
level, as we only observe at the aggregate level how many friends an
agent has, and whether there is a balance between friends and readers.
We show that under general conditions, we can hypothesise from
(A) that an agent with many friends compared to the average produces
more than agents with less friends. This insight relies on the assump-
tion that the friends of a blogger who has more friends than the aver-
age have less friends on average than that blogger. To prove this, let
us find out the expression relating effort with the total level of atten-
tion received from others in one’s network. Maximising Ui(n, e) with
respect to ei, we find that at the optimum, assuming concavity of the
maximisation problem, one obtains C ′(ei) = λi
∑
j 6=i
nji. Suppose nji is
drawn at random, with the distribution of nji’s independent of i’s num-
ber of friends. Then the higher one’s number of friends, the higher
the attention one receives, and the higher one’s effort level. This inde-
pendence assumption would not be verified if agents linked exclusively
with agents that have the same number of friends as they have, or with
agents with the same quality or quantity of content as they have. Con-
sider for example the case where all blog networks are perfect cliques,
i.e. all agents within the network are linked with each other, and none
have links outside the clique. Then content produced would be invari-
ant with the number of friends an agent has. Indeed, in a perfect clique
with N agents, nji = T/N for any j in the clique, since all agents in the
clique have N friends. We would then have C ′(ei) = λiT , and therefore
effort in a clique is unrelated to the number of members of that clique.
A relation between content produced and number of friends therefore
occurs only in networks that are not perfectly connected. This is the
case in blogging networks with ‘small world’ properties that combine
3 A MODEL OF RECIPROCAL (IN)ATTENTION 11
heavily interlinked individuals and links with individuals in other net-
works (Bachnik et al., 2005). We thus contrast two hypotheses, H1 and
H1’ as follows:
Hypothesis H1 (Network size): Bloggers with more friends dis-
play higher levels of content production and general blogging activity.
Hypothesis H1’: There is no relation between a blogger’s number of
friends and her content production.
Support for H1 indicates that bloggers do not form perfect cliques
and/or do not adhere to narrow forms of reciprocity based on one fac-
tor alone (number of friends or comments, content production) and/or
differ in their motivations. It rathers indicate that bloggers form links
based on a wider view of reciprocity where content can be exchanged
for attention.
In the same manner as above, we can hypothesise from (B) that an
agent who is observed not to reciprocate friendships at the aggregate
level (high ratio of readers to friends) produces more content than an-
other agent that reciprocates. As before, what we observe (aggregate
level of reciprocity) is only an imperfect signal of individual levels of
reciprocity. One might very well indeed observe a blogger who appears
to reciprocate on aggregate, even though none of her friendships are
reciprocated while she reciprocates none of her friendships. However,
failing to reciprocate at the individual level is reflected in an increase
in ‘readers’ vs. ‘friends’ at the aggregate level. Consider indeed agent i
with N friends and M readers, and suppose this agent is ‘friended’ by
one additional agent (reader) whose friendship he does not reciprocate.
Then, everything else being equal, agent i’s network aggregate level of
reciprocity went down. This justifies our spelling out hypothesis H2
below:
Hypothesis H2: (Aggregate reciprocity): Bloggers with more
readers than friends produce more content than others.
In what follows, we analyse patterns of relationship and content
production, exemplified by the theoretical framework detailed in this
section, using real data. Our objective is to identify relations between
network size, structure and content production, and check whether hy-
pothesis H1 and H2 are verified. We determine if there is a positive
correlation between how many readers one has and how much content
one produces, and between the level of reciprocity within an agent’s
network18 and how much content is produced by that agent.
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4 The data
The data used in this study are observations on the list of friends, read-
ers, and posting activity of 2767 bloggers, which were selected from the
LiveJournal blog host using a script that chooses bloggers at random.19
The data was collected using Screen-Scraper, which is software that
extract content from websites and add it to a database.20
The descriptive statistics of the sample are given below:
Variables Mean Median St. dev Min Max obs
Friends 81 26 165 1 1944 2767
Readers 104 25 322 1 7855 2515
Number of entries 1049 361 3134 0 62369 2767
Comments received 3439 361 10193 1 239564 2764
Comments posted 3261 517 7148 0 106505 2767
Member 27 14 39 1 506 1481
Entries per day 33.50 0.56 211.74 0 3123 2767
Comments rec. per
post
3.09 1.45 5.29 0 76 2763
Comments made
per friend
37.38 13.66 91.50 0 3109 2718
Duration 1019 1003 865 1 3185 2767
Table 1: Summary Statistics.
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Two noticeable features of the data are skewness and large stan-
dard deviations. So, in what follows, the “typical” user is described by
median values.21 Our blogger lists 26 friends (i.e. she reads the blogs
of 26 LJ users) and, in turn, she is read by 25 bloggers (readers), which
highlights a considerable level of aggregate reciprocity. The number of
comments made/received is also remarkably balanced. The blogger fol-
lows, and is member of, 14 communities. She created 361 entries (posts)
since the blog’s inception. The blog’s lifetime, which is measured by its
duration, the length of time between the creation of the blog and its last
update, is about 1000 days (i.e. approximately 3 years). A new entry is
typically added every 2 days (entries per day). Individual posts receives
1.45 comments on average (comments received per post), whereas the
blogger makes 13.66 comments on the journals of each of her friends
(comments made per friend). This data evidences bloggers’ consider-
able commitment, although the frequency of updating and the posting
activity varies greatly among users.
In view of their skewness, data were transformed on the logarithm
scale for performing regression analysis. Computations were carried
out using the econometrics and statistical softwares Stata and S-Plus.
Appendix A describes the variables in the dataset in greater detail
and compares its characteristics with those of all accounts created on
LJ since its beginnning.
5 Empirical analysis
This section studies the relationship among bloggers’ activity, num-
ber of readers and friends, and a reciprocity measure using regression
techniques. This is done to verify implications of the theoretical model
presented in section 3, namely hypothesis H1 and H2, which we recall
below:
H1 Bloggers who display higher levels of content production and gen-
eral blogging activity have more readers.
H2 Bloggers with less/more friends than readers produce more/less
content than others.
To verify these hypotheses, we estimate a set of activity equations in
which the number of readers and the ratio of readers to friends are re-
gressed on the following measures of bloggers’ effort, divided in three
parts: commitment to one’s blog, posting activity and intensity of inter-
actions with others:
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1. Commitment is measured by the length of time the blog has been
active.
2. Content production is measured by the number of posts per day.
3. Intensity of interactions is measured by
(a) How many comments are received (per posts).
(b) How many comments are posted (per friend).
(c) How many communities the blogger belongs to.
We consider that a blog that has been active for longer does evidence a
higher level of commitment. Posting activity is normalized by length of
activity (posts per day). This allows us to make the difference between
a blog that is active for a long time and presents a low level of posting
activity, and a blog that has been updated for a shorter amount of time
but has been posting more actively. 22
Comments posted and received are normalized per friend and per
post. The number of communities one belongs to has an ambiguous
effect, as a blogger involved in many communities may have less (com-
munities draw attention away from personal blogs) or more readers
(communities are a way to set up relations based on common interests).
Before estimating the activity equations, we analyse the relation-
ship between number of friends and readers by fitting a simple regres-
sion model as follows:
ln(readers) = α + β ln(friends) + u; (4)
Here, the response variable is the logarithm of the number of readers,
and the covariate is the logarithm of the number of friends. Table 2
presents regression estimates from the model:
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ln(readers) se t (p-value)
ln(friends) 0.985∗∗∗ 0.005 208.98 (0.000)
constant 0.103 0.017 6.07 (0.000)
obs 2496
R2 0.942
F (1, 2494) 43673 (0.000)
BP 9.39 (0.002)
RESET 3.41 (0.017)
Table 2: Simple Regression
Legend: obs is number of observations; t is the t-ration of the coefficients; F is the
F statistics for the significance of the regression; BP is the Breusch-Pagan test for
heteroscedasticity; RESET is Ramsey’s test for the omission of relevant variables.
Test p-values are in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗ : < 1%; ∗∗ : < 5%; ∗ : < 10%.
Those results suggest a strong relation between the two variables.
The value of the coefficient on friends is significant and close to 1, indi-
cating that a (percentage) unit increase in the number of friends induce
a nearly 1% increase in the number of readers. The Breusch-Pagan
(BP) test evidence a certain degree of heteroskedasticity in the error
term (This is hardly surprising, as models with individual data often
encounter errors that have heteroskedasticity of unknown form). We
thus report robust standard errors.23
Figure 1 presents the scatterplot of the data and the fitted regres-
sion line:
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Figure 1: Scatterplot of friends vs. readers in a sample of 2767 users of
LiveJournal
Note: Expressed in natural logarithm. Circle size indicates number of observations
at that point. For reference, there are 672 observations at data point (0,0).
We observe that close to zero, observations are more dispersed and
there are more values of readers associated to a specific value of friend
than conversely. Results from the simple regression above also offer a
preliminary idea of the structure – and degree of reciprocity – in the
network. From hypothesis 1, agent (b), who has more friends than
agent (a), should also be more active, while from hypothesis 2, agent
(c), who has the same number of friends but is read by more people
than agent (d), should also be more active. We see in the following
whether network size and imbalances are indeed related in the way we
hypothesize.
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5.1 Testing the first hypothesis
In what follows, we regress the numbers of readers on several indi-
cators of bloggers’ activity, to check whether higher levels of content
production and activity increase the number of readers (H1).
The model is as follows:
ln(readers) = α + β1 ln(member) + β2 ln(entries) + β3 ln(comments received)+
+ β4 ln(comments posted) + β5 ln(duration) + ; (5)
here, member denotes the number of communities one is a member of,
entries the number of entries per day, comments received the number
of received comments (per post), comments posted the number of com-
ments posted (per friend), and duration the duration in days;  is an iid
error term. A preliminary analysis of residuals and leverage revealed
several outlier observations, which we removed.24
The first column of table 3 presents results for the regression of
equation 5.
5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 18
Dependent variable: ln(readers) ln(readers) reciprocity
ln(member) 0.152∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(15.66) (18.17) (-4.29)
ln(entries) 0.579∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗ −0.007
(41.88) (44.39) (0.78)
ln(comments received) 0.776∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(55.49) (57.46) (7.06)
ln(comments posted) −0.463∗∗∗ −0.525∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(-34.07) (-37.04) (13.82)
ln(duration) 0.601∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗
(36.53) (36.11) (-2.12)
reciprocity 0.474∗∗∗
(15.26)
constant 0.781∗∗∗ 0.950∗∗∗ −0.240∗∗∗
(8.03) (9.34) (-3.36)
obs 1334 1334 1357
R2adj 0.880 0.902 0.275
F stat 1550 (0.000) 1646 (0.000) 83 (0.000)
BP 29.27 (0.000) 65.68 (0.000) 6.28 (0.280)
RESET 4.84 (0.000) 5.40 (0.001) 0.92 (0.431)
Table 3: Multiple regressions with measure of reciprocity.
Legend: robust t-ratios are in parentheses; p-values for F, BP and RESET statistics
in parentheses.
One can see that all coefficients are significant. The largest coeffi-
cients are associated with number of comments per post and duration:
a 1% increase in these variables lead, respectively, to about a 0.8% and
a 0.6% increase in the number of readers, cæteris paribus. The small-
est effect is that of the number of communities the blogger belongs to.
Bloggers with more readers write more entries per day (more active),
write less comments per friends (reduction in attention given) but re-
ceive more comments per post (increase in attention received). The
signs of the coefficients are thus consistent with intuition and the pre-
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diction of H1.
Measures of goodness-of-fit suggest the model is quite successful at
describing the data: the R2 shows that the equation explains a great
proportion of the variation in readers, and the F statistic (F stat) for the
overall significance of the regression rejects the null that the slope co-
efficients are jointly zero at any conventional level of significance. The
analysis of regression errors reveals certain degrees of non-normality
and heteroskedasticity in the data, which is confirmed by the Breusch-
Pagan (BP) test statistic. To correct for the potential loss of efficiency,
we compute coefficients’ t-ratio using White’s robust covariance matrix
estimator.
The reciprocity norm:
Before estimating the second activity equation, we consider whether
adherence to a reciprocity norm affects a blogger’s number of friends.
Bloggers may be deterred from friending those bloggers who have more
readers than friends, because the chances of reciprocation are low. Reci-
procity is measured by taking the logarithm of the ratio of readers to
friends, as follows:
reciprocity = ln(readers/friends) (6)
Reciprocity is zero when the number of friends equals the number of
readers. Increases in reciprocity indicate that the number of readers
increases relatively to the number of friends. Estimates of the activity
equation (5) with this added variable are reported in the second col-
umn of table 3: The size and significance of other variables’ effects is
not substantially modified by the inclusion of the new variable, which
suggests that the information contained in reciprocity is incremental
to that provided by other regressors. Controlling for the effect of reci-
procity slightly improves the goodness-of-fit of the model. The value of
the Breusch-Pagan test statistic, however, increases considerably, and
the analysis of partial residuals casts doubts on the explanatory power
of the added variable.
Interesting to note is that ln(readers) = αˆ + βˆX + γˆ(reciprocity) im-
plies
ln(friends) = αˆ + βˆX + (γˆ − 1)(reciprocity) (7)
This means while reciprocity has a positive and statistically significant
effect on the number of readers, the effect of reciprocity on the number
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of friends is negative (0.474− 1 = −0.526). We do not extend the analy-
sis of those effects in this part, since we show in the next section that
reciprocity is a function of activity as well, and thus needs to be instru-
mented.
5.2 Testing the second hypothesis
To examine the second hypothesis (H2), which relates content pro-
duction and reciprocity, we estimate a second equation, in which reci-
procity is regressed on the various activity measures listed in the be-
ginning of this section. The model is as follows:
reciprocity = α + β1 ln(member) + β2 ln(entries) + β3 ln(comments received)+
+ β4 ln(comments posted) + β5 ln(duration) + ; (8)
Explanatory variable are as in the model of equation 5. Estimation
results are given in the last column of table 3. Once again, results
highlight the explanatory power of the activity measures for the net-
work’s properties. All coefficients are significant, with the exception
of the number of entries. Compared to the regression of readers over
activity, it is notable that comments posted per friends and reciprocity
are positively related. It may be that bloggers who entertain closer
relations with their friends (more comments posted) are more attrac-
tive as potential friends, thus attracting more readers, but are also less
likely to reciprocate readership as this would involve making a consid-
erably higher number of comments. The blog’s lifetime and community
membership have negative coefficients, but those coefficients are much
smaller in size than those reported for the first activity equation.
The regression explains about 27% of the variation in the dependent
variable, which is not at all disappointing. The F test statistic for the
regression decisively rejects the null of joint lack of significance of the
regressors. Notably, the Breusch-Pagan test does not reject its null of
constant variance.
In summary, results from this analysis show that there exist a pos-
itive and statistically significant relation between level of activity and
number of readers, confirming hypothesis (H1). The evidence in fa-
vor of hypothesis (H2) is less favorable, but offers some interesting in-
sights. The variable comments posted displays the most significant and
largest effect on reciprocity. Noticeably, this variable is mostly related
to the level of blogs’ interactivity, in that it measures the activity of the
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blogger in other users’ blogs, as opposed to indicators of activity in her
own blog (such as, for example, entries posted). This can be interpreted
as evidence that willingness to interact does affect network patterns,
and increases the number of readers relatively to number of friends.
In this analysis, reciprocity entered the activity equations both as
an explanatory and a dependent variable. Indeed, we argued that ad-
herence to the reciprocity norm may affect ‘friending’ patterns. This re-
quires the investigation of the possibly endogenous effect of reciprocity
in the equation for the number of readers:
5.3 Instrumental Variable Estimation
This section applies a version of the instrumental variable technique
to the estimation of the equation for the number of readers. This allow
us to test for the endogeneity of the reciprocity measure, and to treat
is as an exogenous variable in the model of the number of readers.
Results are shown in table 5, in appendix C, along with OLS estimates
for comparison.
IV coefficients are consistently higher than those produced by the
corresponding OLS regression, with the exception of the variable mem-
ber, which is no longer significant.25 The most striking result refers to
the effect of reciprocity: this variable enters the IV activity equation
with a large elasticity of about 3.5, and its effect is negative in sign.
Hausman’s test statistics rejects its null of exogeneity of reciprocity at
every significance level, which supports the adequacy of the IV proce-
dure.
Interestingly, these results are consistent with bloggers attaching
a ‘stigma’ to failing to reciprocate. Indeed, the negative sign of reci-
procity implies that when the number of readers increases relatively to
the number of bloggers who are befriended, then the number of readers
(and of friends) is lower than what measures of activity would predict.
It may be, as conjectured previously, that bloggers do not want to friend
bloggers who appear unlikely to reciprocate. However, it may also be
that a blogger with many readers may reach a limit on how many read-
ers she can add back as friends and reasonably follow, and thus be less
likely to reciprocate beyond that limit. It could also be that those blog-
gers who do not adhere to the norm do not care about how many friends
they get, which is why they get less of them.
In the following, we examine whether some of the effect of reci-
procity is rather due to imbalances in the bloggers’ networks – net-
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works that are balanced being more (or less) attractive, while imbal-
ances in any direction are stigmatized or valued.
5.4 The effect of imbalances
We explore in this part whether there might be an effect from hav-
ing unbalanced friendships, i.e. not only from not reciprocating friend-
ships, but also from maintaining unreciprocated friendships. Indeed,
the analysis so far has not explicitly considered how imbalances relates
to blogging activity’s measures. This is because reciprocity measures
the number of readers relatively to the number of friends. It does not
tell us, however, whether the network becomes more or less asymmet-
ric. As a result, the interpretation of the effect of reciprocity in the
activity equations is ambiguous. Quite apart of the relative number
of friends vs readers, bloggers may react to whether a fellow blogger
maintains a balance between friends and readers or not. For example,
a blogger who friends too many bloggers relative to how many read her
back in return could be seen as too eager, or indifferent to the act of re-
ciprocation, and thus get less readers than her activity would suggest.
We therefore consider the effect of a measure of network imbal-
ances, called asymmetry, and defined as follows:
asymmetry = ln(1 + |readers− friends|) (9)
Here, one can see that any departure from zero signals an increase in
the asymmetry of the network. Note that this measure differs from
taking, for example, the absolute value of reciprocity, as it depends not
on the proportion of readers vs. friends, but on the number of friends
who don’t read you or the number of readers whom you don’t read in
return.
Using the measure of imbalance given above, we re-estimated the
two activity equations of sections 5.1 and 5.2. Table 6 in appendix
D presents results from this estimation. Magnitude, sign and signifi-
cance of individual coefficients in column 2 compare to those reported
in column 2 of table 3, except that the coefficient on asymmetry is lower
than the coefficient on reciprocity. Regressions using both the measure
of reciprocity and of asymmetry as regressors show that both measures
are significant, with a higher coefficient on reciprocity (0.368) than on
asymmetry (0.148). Care should be exercised however when interpret-
ing those results, due to collinearity between the two variables. Fur-
ther research is needed to disentangle the effect of both measures. One
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should note that the measure of asymmetry enters the readers’ equa-
tion with a positive sign, even when estimating using the instrumental
variable method.26 The effect of imbalances is thus positive on the
number of readers.27 This is not what we expected and should be the
subject of further research.
Column 3 shows that the degree of asymmetry of the network is
positively related to activity. Results are considerably better when us-
ing the measure of asymmetry than when using the measure of reci-
procity (column 3 of table 3), both in terms of magnitude and signifi-
cance of individual effects, and of overall significance of the regression.
We checked that coefficients were similar whether considering positive
or negative values of (readers−friends). Why this relation between ac-
tivity and asymmetry would hold is a matter for speculation. It may be
for example that some bloggers “friend” many bloggers with the hope
of attracting readership through a high level of activity, while recipro-
cation of friendship comes only with a lag. This could be checked with
a panel data set.
6 Conclusion
This paper analysed patterns of relationship and content production
among bloggers from a theoretical and empirical perspective. The anal-
ysis has identified statistically significant positive relationships be-
tween the size of and degree of reciprocity within a blogger’s network
of relations, and her blog’s durability, intensity of activity and degree of
interactivity. We also found that failing to reciprocate was sanctioned
with a lower popularity than other measures of activity might normally
warrant. This can be interpreted in terms of bloggers sanctioning de-
viations from the norm of reciprocity, when a blogger does not return
friendship as expected.
The ‘endogenous’ character of network relationships, however, makes
their empirical analysis difficult. For example, it is hard to determine
which comes first: having many readers or producing a lot of content.
More research is needed on what determines the reciprocation of re-
lationships in the network. Future work will rely on the collection of
individual data over several periods, and will also rely on the gather-
ing of further quantitative and qualitative information, such as blogs’
rankings on search engines and differences in bloggers’ attitudes and
objectives. This will hopefully enable us to address those difficulties.
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Notes
1http://www.scribd.com/doc/219285/Blogging-Revenue-Study, accessed February 21,
2009.
2http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspx?id=1006799, accessed February 21, 2009.
3http://www.brodeurmediasurvey.com, accessed February 25, 2009.
4http://tinyurl.com/62ja4e, accessed February 25, 2009.
5http://tinyurl.com/acbwcn, accessed February 21, 2009.
6More information on LJ and its history can be found in its Wikipedia entry (
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/livejournal, accessed February 21, 2009).
7Source: http://www.livejournal.com/stats.bml, accessed February 9, 2009.
8Data on individual bloggers’ gender is not available publicly but is collected by
LJ for internal statistical purposes, with an option for the user not to disclose gender
on registration.
9Bloggers do not have to display their age publicly, but their birth date must be
provided to LJ for legal reasons.
10Users can provide additional information in the “bio”, a space where bloggers
present themselves.
11Not all users choose to make such ‘filtered’ entries, but a large portion restrict
access to at least some of their posts.
12Other forms of status are associated to the length of time one has been on LJ,
to the design of one’s LJ, to the identity of one’s friends, to the popularity of the
communities one maintains, and occasionally, to the quality of one’s entries! Status
may also be imported from the ‘real world’.
13A number of tools are available on LJ to prevent unwanted interaction, for exam-
ple making one’s entries friends only, preventing or screening comments by people
other than friends, listing unwanted (unreciprocated) friends in a separate list, ban-
ning unwanted friends from commenting in one’s journal, etc...
14For more on the social dynamics of LiveJournal, see Raynes-Goldie (2004) and
Marwick (2009).
15We found that pattern to be generally observed on LiveJournal (not reported here
for lack of space).
16More general utility representations could be adopted and would generate the
same set of insights.
17We assume that agent i is able to predict the result of a whole chain of reaction
and counter-reaction to the establishment of this new friendship, and thus knows
how e and n come out after he or she establishes the link. This expression of net
surplus thus takes account of the fact that additional attention by a new friend i may
lead a blogger to increase his or her own activity and modify the attention she gives
to other agents in the network.
18proxied by ln Friend ofFriends ) or by sgn(Friend of -Friends)ln(1 + |Friend of -Friends|).
19http://www.livejournal.com/random.bml
20http://www.screen-scraper.com
21As it is often pointed out, the median offers a better description of the center of
a distribution than the mean when data are skewed, because it is robust to extreme
values.
22When considering the effect of blogs’ lifetime, one should also note that a blogger
who has been updating for a long time is likely to accumulate many friends, irre-
spective of his or her level of activity. This is because there is some inertia in the
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friending process on LiveJournal: LJers tend to keep a blogger on their list even af-
ter that blogger has stopped updating and as long as that blogger does not drop them.
Indeed, some bloggers like to inflate their list of friends and readers and thus may
maintain reciprocal links long after they ceased being active.
23Robust standard errors are computed using the option robust in Stata, which
implements the estimator proposed by White (1980).
24The removal of outlier observations follows the procedure proposed by Belsley
(1980), which identifies highly influential observations as those characterised by ei-
ther a high leverage or a high residual.
25The model is estimated using 2 Stage Least Squares procedure. Identification
is achieved by excluding comments posted from the IV regression, as this variable
is highly correlated with the reciprocity measure. More details on this estimation
method can be found in Greene (1980), chapter 5.
26Results for IV regressions are not reported for reasons of space. They are avail-
able from the authors on request.
27Deducing the effect of imbalances on the number of friends cannot be computed
in the same way as in equation (7). Results from the regression replacing readers
with friends show the same positive effect, whether using the instrumental variable
method or not.
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A Data Description
A.1 Original data
• User: User name (pseudonym)
• Location: Region and /or country where the blogger is based.
• Friends: Number and list of weblogs read by the blogger. Limited
to other blogs on LJ.
• Readers (or ‘friend of ’ in LJ terminology): List of those bloggers
with an account on LJ who read one’s weblog. This can be divided
between:
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– Mutual friends: A subgroup of ‘readers’: Number and list of
those bloggers whose friendship is reciprocated. This statis-
tic is not provided as a default and must be activated by the
user.
– Also friend of: A subgroup of ‘readers’: number and list of
those bloggers whose friendship is not reciprocated. Again,
this statistic is not provided as a default and must be acti-
vated by the user.
• Communities: Number and list of communities the blogger reads.
Communities are blogs with a specific theme to which all mem-
bers can contribute posts and comments.
• Member of: Number and list of the communities one is member
of. Differs from ‘communities’ in that one can read a community
without being a member of it (but one generally cannot contribute
if one is not a member).
• Posting access: Differs from ‘member of ’ in that one can be a mem-
ber of a community but not have access to posting there.
• Feeds: Number and list of those weblogs not on LiveJournal that
are read by the blogger via LJ. Those can be read via their RSS
feed and appear on the blogger’s ‘friends’ page’ (list of entries by
friends).
• Account type: Accounts, can be ‘free’, ‘sponsored’, ‘paid’; ‘perma-
nent’ or belong to ‘early adopters’. ‘Early adopters’ are the first
few members of LJ. ‘Paid’ accounts give access to the full range
of LJ’s services and do not display any advertising. ‘Permanent
accounts’ are accounts that are paid for life. ‘Sponsored’ accounts’
display advertising. ‘Free’ accounts displays less advertising than
sponsored accounts but have reduced functionality.
• Date created: Date on which the weblog was created.
• Date updated: Last date on which the weblog was updated (i.e.
when an entry was last posted).
• Journal entries: Number of posts written since the weblog was
created
• Comments posted: Number of comments made on entries in other
weblogs or communities.
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• Comments received: Number of comments made by other blog-
gers on one’s own entries, and own comments in reply to those.
A.2 Processed data:
• Days since creation: Difference between date of data collection
and date of creation of the blog (in days).
• Days since update: Difference between date of data collection and
date of the last update (days).
• Duration: Difference between date of creation and date of last
update (days).
• Active: 1 if weblog was updated less than 8 weeks ago, 0 other-
wise.
• Entries per day: Number of journal entries divided by duration
• Comments per post: Comments received divided by number of
posts
• Comments per friends: Comments made divided by number of
friends.
• Reciprocity: Readers divided by friends, expressed in logarithm.
A.3 Representativity of the sample
Table 4 compares features of the randomly selected bloggers to those of
LJ, for an informal check of the representativeness of the sample:28
Random sample LiveJournal
Updated last month 100% 7%
Updated last week 100% 3%
Updated on the day 61% 1%
Countries US: 38%, Russia: 31%,
Ukraine: 8%, Canada:
3%, UK: 3%.
US: 63%, Russia: 13%,
Canada: 6%, UK: 5%.
Age (in years) Average: 30, Median: 27,
Mode: 24.
Average: 25, Median: 22,
Mode: 20.
Table 4: Comparison table
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One can see that the stock of bloggers on LJ are young and predom-
inantly located in the US. The random sample is essentially a repre-
sentation of active bloggers on LJ. This is because the random script
provided by LJ is designed to select active blogs in order to spare the
user having to sift through inactive blogs. The distribution of national-
ity thus reflects countries in which LJ is presently popular (Russia and
Ukraine), rather than LJ’s country of origin (the US), where competi-
tion from Bebo and Facebook dented LJ’s popularity among high school
and college students respectively. This is also why the average age of
bloggers in our sample is higher than in LJ’s stock.
B Figures
Figure 2 represents the evolution of the number of blogs from 2000 to
2005 (in logarithmic scale).
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Figure 2: Number of hosted weblogs created between 2000 and 2005.
Source: Henning (2005) and LJ statistics (http://www.livejournal.com/stats/stats.txt),
both accessed February 20, 2009.
C Instrumental variable estimation of num-
ber of readers
Table 5 shows the result of the instrumental variable estimation of the
number of readers.
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ln(readers) IV OLS
ln(member) 0.024 0.200∗∗∗
(-10.45) ( 13.50)
ln(entries) 0.610∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗
(13.10) ( 22.90)
ln(comments received) 1.034∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗
(17.69) (34.70)
ln(comments posted) (instrument)
ln(duration) 0.595∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(9.15) (11.87)
reciprocity −3.545∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(-10.45) (1.64)
constant −0.473∗∗∗ 1.507∗∗∗
(-1.05) (9.28)
obs 1334 1334
Hausman test 114.88 (0.000)
Table 5: IV regression of first activity equation: model estimates and
comparison with OLS regression.
Legend: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
D The effect of network imbalances
Table 6 shows the results of the estimation of the activity equations
using the asymmetry measure.
D THE EFFECT OF NETWORK IMBALANCES 34
Dependent variable: ln(readers) ln(readers) asymmetry
ln(member) 0.152∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(15.66) (13.64) (9.59)
ln(entries) 0.579∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗
(41.88) (36.32) (13.82)
ln(comments received) 0.776∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗
(55.49) (49.06) (16.18)
ln(comments posted) −0.463∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗ −0.507∗∗∗
(-34.07) (-27.54) (-14.53)
ln(duration) 0.601∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗
(36.53) (33.39) (12.58)
asymmetry 0.176∗∗∗
(18.81)
constant 0.781∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗ −0.161
(8.03) (8.23) (-0.67)
obs 1334 1334 1357
R2adj 0.880 0.908 0.411
F stat 1550 (0.000) 2127 (0.000) 177 (0.000)
BP 29.27 (0.000) 22.20 (0.001) 54.86 (0.000)
RESET 4.84 (0.000) 4.76 (0.001) 5.00 (0.000)
Table 6: Multiple regressions with measure of asymmetry.
Legend: robust t-ratios are in parentheses; p-values for F, BP and RESET statistics
in parentheses.
